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a b s t r a c t
Šešelja and Straßer’s critique fails to hit its target for two main reasons. First, the argument is not that
Kuhn is a rationalist because he is a coherentist. Although Kuhn can be taken as a rationalist because
of his commitment to epistemic values, coherence analysis provides a more comprehensive character-
isation of cognitive process in scientiﬁc change than any of these values alone can offer. Further, we
should understand Kuhn as characterising science as the best form of rationality we have outside logic,
which rules out algorithmic rationality and allows non-cognitive factors to play a role in theory
change. Second, Šešelja and Straßer overemphasise the importance of a priori reasoning in Kuhn,
which was only an alternative to his earlier historical-empirical approach. My suggestion is that Kuhn’s
neo-Kantian historical cognitivism integrates the earlier empirical and the later a-prioristic orienta-
tions. According to it, that any understanding of the world is preconditioned by some kind of mental
module that is liable to change, detected as a discontinuity in the historical record of science.
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1. Introduction
Šešelja & Straßer (2009) put forward many worthwhile sugges-
tions of how to understand Kuhn’s philosophy in their extremely
interesting critical paper. However, their analysis is problematic
for a number of reasons and their critique fails to hit its target.
First, incorporating Kuhn into coherentist epistemology is not the
ultimate or only reason to regard him as a rationalist, and it is a
mistake to take me to argue for a ‘strong notion of rationality’.
The most fruitful interpretation of Kuhn is to take him as charac-
terising rationality in science: that is, as outlining the best form
of rationality we have outside logic. The point of coherence
analysis is to offer a more comprehensive characterisation of cog-
nitive process than any of Kuhn’s cognitive values alone can offer,
in a way that also sheds light on the nature of scientiﬁc change in
general. Further, it would be misguided to crave for ideal algorith-
mic rationality in studies of science. Instead, we have to be content
with a weaker form of rationality, according to which both cogni-
tive and non-cognitive factors determine outcomes in science.
Second, although Šešelja and Straßer correctly point out that
the later Kuhn wished to use a priori reasoning in order to reach
the conclusions of his historical perspective, they overstate their
a-prioristic reading of Kuhn. A priori reasoning only represented
an alternative to Kuhn’s earlier empirical approach that relied on
studying the history of science. Further, Kuhn’s alleged rejection
of the mind-independent world cannot be the rationale to reject
the correspondence theory for the reason that an idealist can be
a correspondence theorist. In actuality, it is doubtful that Kuhn
was inclined to any kind of full-blooded idealism that discounts
the existence of the mind-independent world. My suggestion is
that latterly Kuhn’s neo-Kantian cognitivism integrates the earlier
empirical and the later a-prioristic approaches. He suggested that
we stop referring to the world an sich, because it is beyond our
reach. Kuhn argues that any understanding of the world is precon-
ditioned by some kind of mental module that is liable to change,
manifested as discontinuity in the historical record of science.
2. Rationality in science and coherence analysis
Šešelja and Straßer argue that the coherentist interpretation
does not offer us any interesting notion of rationality, which would
not be found in Kuhn’s texts anyway. Speciﬁcally, coherentism
does not guarantee or lead to a strong notion of rationality,
according to which a unique theory choice is strictly determined
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via an application of theory evaluation criteria. If Kuhn’s writings
already offer us a weak notion of rationality without a strict deter-
mination of theory choice and Kuhn already explicated his view on
theory choice, they ask, why refer to coherentism in the ﬁrst place?
The problem is that I never said that ‘Kuhn’s philosophy does
not necessarily lead to an abandonment of rational inter-paradigm
theory comparison, since it can be incorporated into coherentist
epistemology’ (Šešelja & Straßer, 2009, Sect. 3; my emphasis). In
order to get matters straight, I hope I may be forgiven for quoting
the crucial piece of textual evidence. In reference to epistemic val-
ues, I wrote:
We can see that the talk of Kuhn as an outright irrationalist is a
misrepresentation. Even if these standards are not ‘point-by-
point’ in the way that the comparison of unambiguous truth-
values requires, Kuhn clearly recognises some common theory
comparison criteria. I wish to go further than this and show that
his philosophy contains elements that make it ﬁt well with a
coherentist epistemology. (Kuukkanen, 2007, p. 559; my
emphasis)
In other words, the point is not that Kuhn was a rationalist, be-
cause he was a coherentist. We are apparently in agreement that
Kuhn can be seen as a rationalist with or without coherentism.
But one should remember that until recently any rationalistic read-
ing of Kuhn was very contentious in philosophy of science. The
great rationality debates of the 1960s and 1970s persistently
placed Kuhn beyond any form of rationality, that is, he was seen
as an outright irrationalist. It is sufﬁcient here to remind ourselves
of Lakatos’s words, ‘in Kuhn’s view scientiﬁc revolution is irratio-
nal, a matter for mob psychology’ (Lakatos, 1970, p. 178). This is
the general background of my argument, not any attempt to por-
tray Kuhn as an advocate of an algorithmic kind of rationality,
which he clearly wasn’t (see Kuukkanen, 2007, p. 562). To say that
Kuhn can be seen as a rationalist at all is news, as I suspect there is
no consensus on this even today.
However, the authors are right that there is need for further
explication of the notion of rationality. Their contribution is to
emphasise that there is looseness in the application of Kuhn’s
epistemic criteria, and that his account of theory choice allows
the employment of both cognitive criteria and non-cognitive fac-
tors. Let’s talk about rationality then. I have a suggestion to make.
Šešelja and Straßer suggest that it might be desirable to assess
science with the measuring rod of ideal rationality. As they state,
any weak form of rationality implied by coherence analysis is not
satisfactory for ‘somephilosophersof science’ (2009, Sect. 1 andSect.
3). Well, so much the worse for those philosophers. It is somewhat
pointless to crave the strong notion of rationality in science, and I
agree with the authors that this would represent a wrong track in
terms of reading Kuhn’s philosophy. The most fruitful view of Kuhn
and rationality in science is not the one that despairs of the ‘rational-
ity gap’ between an algorithmic sort of rationality and what Kuhn
says about science, or that reads Kuhn as an irrationalist, but the
one that takes Kuhn to characterise science as the best form of ratio-
nalitywehaveoutside logic.AsKuhnsomewhatcolourfullyput it, ‘to
suppose, instead, that we posses criteria of rationality which are
independent of our understanding of the essentials of the scientiﬁc
process is to open the door to cloud-cuckoo land’ (Kuhn, 2000, p.
159). There is by nowan avalanche ofworks in history and sociology
of science that show that the applicationof strong rationality or pure
internal logic is nothing but hopeless. It justmay be the case thatwe
have to be content with some weaker form of rationality, according
towhich not only cognitive criteria but also social and historical fac-
tors have a role in determining outcomes in science.
So what’s the point of coherence analysis, if it doesn’t imply a
stronger account of rationality that is within our reach in Kuhn
anyway? The answer is implicit above, but let’s spell it out. The
point is to go ‘further’ (Kuukkanen, 2007, p. 559) than the standard
rationalist reading of Kuhn via single epistemological values, or to
interpret Kuhn as a rationalist ‘even to the extent’ (ibid., p. 562)
that he might have accepted a more general epistemological meth-
od of evaluation. To say that theory choices are made on the basis
of coherentist criteria tells us more about the dynamics of scientiﬁc
change than, for example, a claim that consistency or accuracy is
one of the main cognitive factors behind scientists’ theory choices.
In other words, coherentism is a more comprehensive character-
isation of the cognitive process behind theory change than any of
the ﬁve or six criteria alone can offer. As Šešelja and Straßer make
clear, there is looseness in the preference order of different criteria
and in the exact application of values. In fact, trade-offs between
them are frequent. One may emphasise more simplicity and prob-
lem-solving potentiality on one occasion, and consistency and
problem-solving capability on another. And there is no guarantee
that everyone agrees about the degree of simplicity of a certain
theory, for example. This is why science is human-made and, up
to a certain point, scientists are free to choose and judge. But to
suggest that coherentism guides scientiﬁc activity implies that all
the values that Kuhn mentions are linked so that they function
as part of a more general epistemological framework. If my
analysis is correct, the value of the coherence analysis is that it tells
us more about scientiﬁc change itself and therefore more about
rationality in science as well.
Taking coherentism as an aim in science would mean that one
of the most important driving forces in science is to achieve as
coherent an account of nature as possible (even if the total coher-
ence of all sciences may decrease as a result of the speciation of sci-
entiﬁc ﬁelds). If one is interested in scientiﬁc change, this ought to
be an informative assertion. To take one example, the phenomenon
where new theories cannot explain all the problems of old theories
has sometimes been called ‘Kuhn-loss’.1 Kuhn-loss raises the ques-
tion why it would be reasonable to accept a new theory if it is
accompanied by such an explanatory loss. This is something that
happened in the Copernican revolution, where it took no fewer than
100 years for Copernicanism to become the dominant paradigm
(Kuhn, 1957, p. 227). The coherence analysis might offer an answer,
which is that the loss in the immediate problem-solving capability
was compensated by an improvement with respect to other episte-
mic values, such as harmony and simplicity, promising a more
coherent system as a whole. In actuality, this is one of the cases
where Kuhn refers directly to coherence as an explanatory factor
in scientiﬁc change, but of course there were other (extrascientiﬁc)
inﬂuencing factors, such as the need for calendar reform as well
(Kuhn, 1957, p. 171; see also pp. 11–12, 124–126).
3. Rejection of which theory of truth?
Let’s now move on to the second challenge. This time Šešelja
and Straßer get the interpretation right. I still believe that Kuhn’s
argument against the idea that science convergences on the truth
was motivated by empirical observations, because he didn’t ﬁnd
continuity in the history of science to justify that position. Kuhn’s
famous Aristotle experience, which made him realise that there is a
conceptual and ontological break between Aristotelian and Newto-
nian sciences, was probably the most important single event that
shaped Kuhn’s thinking and one to which he referred often
(Kuukkanen, 2008, pp. 51–55). The really interesting question is,
had Kuhn not experienced that there is no ‘historical evidence for
1 For a list of references on ‘Kuhn-loss’, see Gattei (2008), p. 69 n. 203.
J.-M. Kuukkanen / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (2009) 328–331 329
a process of zeroing in’ (Kuhn, 2000, p. 206), would he have be-
come an advocate of the truth-progressive image of science? My
view is that he quite possibly would have done so. In this sense,
Kuhn was part of the tradition that perhaps somewhat naively
looked for empirical validation or falsiﬁcation of metahistorical
views, best continued by Larry Laudan (e.g. 1981) and most re-
cently by Stathis Psillos (2005) on the other side of the debate.2
The authors note that one obstacle to overcome is Kuhn’s objec-
tion to the correspondence theory. For how otherwise can one
maintain that Kuhn would have been able to agree about the con-
vergence of science to the truth, that is, a view of being true in the
sense of correspondence, if he thought that the whole idea of cor-
respondence was fundamentally ﬂawed? The authors are not im-
pressed by my suggestion, and I am not alone in making it (e.g.
Bird, 2000, pp. 225–227; Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, pp. 263–264),
that Kuhn might have misunderstood the correspondence theory
and taken it as an epistemic theory. Šešelja and Straßer claim that
Kuhn’s argument against convergent realism was a priori and that
Kuhn offered a principled rejection of the correspondence theory.
In their view, a necessary condition for being a correspondence
theorist about truth is to assume that there is a mind-independent
world. ‘Kuhn’s attack on the correspondence theory of truth is an
attack on one of its main constitutive ideas—the notion of the
mind-independent world’ (Šešelja & Straßer, 2009, Sect. 4). Unfor-
tunately, this suggestion is just bound to add more confusion about
the correspondence theory of truth. It is true that the correspon-
dence theory is often associated with realism, or more precisely
with a realist theory of truth, which says that the state of affairs
that makes a truth-bearer true has to be mind-independent (e.g.
Kirkham, 1995, pp. 73–79). However, a commitment to a mind-
independent world is not necessary for being a correspondence
theorist. All the correspondence theorist has to hold is that our
chosen truth-bearers correspond in some sense to a certain state
of affairs, not that the state of affairs is mind-independent. In other
words, an absolute idealist who holds that the whole world is
God’s creation can be a correspondence theorist. She may hold that
truth consists in correspondence to mind-dependent facts (e.g.
Kirkham, 1995, pp. 131–134). If Kuhn’s reason for rejecting the cor-
respondence theory of truth was thus the denial of a mind-inde-
pendent world, his rejection cannot be said to be well grounded.
But the fact remains that Kuhn does talk about abandoning the
idea of a mind-independent world. But in what sense? The authors
provide a clue in one of their Kuhn quotations. Kuhn says that ‘no
sense can be made of the notion of reality as it has ordinarily func-
tioned in philosophy of science’ (Kuhn, 2000, p. 115; my emphasis).
Kuhn is thus talking about the problems with the notion as it had
been applied in philosophy of science, not rejecting it as such. It is
difﬁcult to take Kuhn as a full-blooded idealist, as there is plenty of
evidence to the contrary. He was inclined to accept what might be
called ‘ﬁg-leaf realism’ (Devitt, 1997, p. 23), according to which
something exists independently of the mental although we may
not be able to specify what and in what form. Kuhn described him-
self as an ‘unregenerate realist’ (Kuhn, 2000, p. 203). He also im-
plied that nature undermines the security of the professional
community (ibid., p. 169), that nature has a role to play in shaping
our conceptions (Kuhn, 1977, p. 72), that the world ‘places rigid
constraints’ (Kuhn, 2000, p. 102), and that the role of nature cannot
be left out of the explanations of science (ibid., p. 317).
The more one reads Kuhn the better one sees that epistemic
concerns feature prominently in his thinking. I think Hoyningen-
Huene got this right in pointing out that Kuhn thought it meaning-
less to talk of a theory-free, ‘object-sided’ world and therefore of a
match between theories and the object-sided world (Hoyningen-
Huene, 1993, pp. 263–264). The issue turns on Kuhn’s idea that
any conception of the world is lexicon-dependent, i.e. it is medi-
ated via some conceptual machinery that makes the experience
possible. Let’s call this the phenomenal world. However, it is worth
pointing out once more that Kuhn never denied that there can be a
mind- and lexicon-independent world. There ‘must, of course, be
something permanent, ﬁxed, and stable . . . like Kant’s Ding an sich’
(Kuhn, 2000, p. 104). The problem with that world is that it is be-
yond our reach.
Šešelja and Straßer correctly point out that latterly Kuhn sug-
gested the concept of truth can be used only internally, inside a
lexicon. Interestingly, in contrast to clear-cut rejections of the
correspondence theory, it is also possible to ﬁnd perhaps a reluc-
tant commitment to it or at least to a minimalist version of it. Kuhn
says ‘What replaces it [the correspondence theory] will still require
a strong conception of truth, but not, except in the most trivial
sense, correspondence truth’, which could be something like a
redundancy theory (Kuhn, 2000, pp. 95, 98). The most that we
can say is that Kuhn rejected the realist theory of truth when he
thought he rejected the correspondence theory, because the appar-
ent reason for the rejection is that the nature of objects depends on
our conceptual schemes or epistemic capabilities (see Kirkham,
1995, p. 73).
But we also learn that the essential function of the concept of
truth is to ‘require choice between acceptance and rejection of a
statement or a theory in the face of evidence’ (Kuhn, 2000, p. 99),
i.e. some kind of epistemic theory of truth (e.g. ibid., pp. 114–
115, 95–96). Further, after criticising the correspondence theory,
Kuhn usually refers to the comparative epistemic criteria that
can be used in theory choices. Šešelja and Straßer reasonably con-
clude that the non-epistemic character of the correspondence the-
ory is nonsensical for Kuhn (Šešelja & Straßer, 2009, Sect. 4). One
wonders whether Kuhn’s reason really forms a principled rejection
of the correspondence theory of truth or perhaps, as I see it, its
abandonment on epistemic-pragmatic grounds.
4. Empirical and a priori approaches integrated
The authors get their a priori argument half-right. In the latter
part of his career, Kuhn was fascinated by a priori argumentation.
However, this should not be used to conceal the fact that Kuhn’s
historical inclination in his early career was strong. I take it that
the authors don’t think that Kuhn achieved his ideas about scien-
tiﬁc revolutions and scientiﬁc change in The structure of scientiﬁc
revolutions by a priori reasoning? Maybe it is sufﬁcient here to take
two sentences from the very ﬁrst paragraph of Structure:
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or
chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the
image of science by which we are now possessed . . . [The] aim
[of this essay] is a sketch of the quite different concept of sci-
ence that can emerge from the historical record of the research
activity itself. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 1)
One is not short of similar textual material.
Kuhn’s transition from empiricist argumentation to a priori rea-
soning can actually be seen in the quotations given by Šešelja and
Straßer. Kuhn says:
my generation of philosophers/historians saw ourselves as
building a philosophy on observations of actual scientiﬁc
behavior . . . Given what I shall call the historical perspective,
2 It now seems to me unrealistic that any one metahistorical view of science could be proved to be uniquely correct. It is likely that any empirical argument for such a view is
irreducibly philosophically laden.
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one can reach many of the central conclusions we drew with
scarcely a glance at the historical record itself.
And he says ‘many of the most central conclusions we drew from
the historical record can be derived instead from ﬁrst principles’
(Kuhn, 2000, pp. 111–112). In other words, Kuhn admits that he
and other historical philosophers of science drew conclusions from
historical record. He adds that the same conclusion can be derived
from ‘ﬁrst principles’. ‘Can’ does not, of course, imply that they
must. Kuhn is envisioning an alternative way to reach the conclu-
sions of his historical perspective, which by no means nulliﬁes the
earlier empirical attempt.
But, all in all, it is true that Kuhn appeared to undergo this
change of mind. He felt that a priori reasoning would offer him a
ﬁrmer standpoint and thus ‘reduce contingency’ of his arguments.
This is well documented also in Kuhn’s publishing record, which
consists solely of historical publications at the beginning, but in-
cludes only philosophical articles at the end. Kuhn appeared to
move year by year from his historical-empirical approach to more
and more purely philosophical argumentation.
I have long been of the opinion that Kuhn’s turn to a priori rea-
soning represented a wrong or at least very strange turning (see
Bird, 2002; Andersen, 2001, p. 76) in his otherwise empirically
minded approach. What makes this turning especially surprising
is that at the same time he adopted a very cognitive scientiﬁc
vocabulary of mental modules, lexicons, lexical structures, and
neural mechanisms (for example Kuhn, 2000, pp. 229, 245) that
have subsequently been shown to receive a fruitful interpretation
by the machinery of cognitive science (for example Andersen,
Barker, & Chen, 1996). However, there may actually be an entirely
rational explanation for this double-sided image, which brings the
empirical and a priori sides interestingly together.
It is likely that the later Kuhn found an explanation in the form
of historical neo-Kantianism for the phenomena of historical dis-
continuity and changes of conceptual schemes that the young
Kuhn detected in the history of science. Further, the new mentalis-
tic notions that underpin his Kantianism were meant to explain
how experience of the world is pre-conditioned. For example, he
says that a ‘structured lexicon’ ‘resembles Kant’s a priori when
the latter is taken in its . . . relativized sense’ (Kuhn, 2000, p. 245).
We would do well to consider a Kantian interpretation alternative
to the full-blooded idealistic one. Kuhn meant not that there is lit-
erally no mind-independent world, but that any attempt to express
the world has to be constructed via a conceptual scheme. Scientists
cannot reach the world-in-itself but are limited to their phenome-
nal worlds. Any intelligible representation of the world is thus con-
ceptual-scheme-related, which makes it meaningless to refer to
the world as such. In this way, the ideas of ‘mental module’,
(mind-related) ‘lexicon’, its communal equivalent ‘lexical struc-
ture’, and the earlier ‘conceptual scheme’ promised Kuhn an expla-
nation of what he had discovered by ﬁrst-person observation and
corroborated several times using the historical record. That is, all
views of the world require some holistic form of pre-conditioning,
and different times and cultures have their own systems, seen as
radical discontinuity in the historical record of science.
But even after this, the meaningfulness and applicability of this
kind of explanation depend on whether the historical record actu-
ally shows such changes and discontinuity. Let us conduct a
thought experiment. What if Kuhn had not arrived at the conclu-
sion that the history of science is full of radical transitions but
had found only continuity and accumulation of data? This would
be a case where scientists operate with one conceptual scheme
and keep specifying and correcting it gradually. Would he have in-
sisted that scientists are not getting anything right about the
world, or perhaps admit, expressed in Kantian terms, that the phe-
nomenal worlds of scientists are achieving better and better
approximations to the world as such? Kuhn answered this
question:
The threat to realism is the foremost of the problems I have in
mind . . . A lexicon acquired . . . gives members of the commu-
nity that employs it conceptual access to an inﬁnite set of lexi-
cally stipulated worlds . . . As time passes, continuing research
excludes more and more possible worlds from the subset that
could be actual. If all scientiﬁc development proceeded in this
way, the progress of science would consist in ever closer speci-
ation of a single world, the actual or real one. (Kuhn, 2000,
p. 76)
But Kuhn’s point, ultimately, was that it does not.
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